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THE ONE SENATOR, ONE VOTE CLAUSE 
William N. Eskridge, Jr.* 
Article I, section 3, clause 1 provides that the Senate "shall 
be composed of two Senators from each State, * * * and each 
Senator shall have one Vote." The requirement that each state 
have two Senators was part of the "Great Compromise" reached 
in Philadelphia, and may still be defensible today, to assure that 
the Senate would be a deliberative body with relatively few 
members and that the interests of the states qua states would be 
represented. The requirement that each Senator have one vote 
was also part of the Great Compromise but is much harder to 
defend today. In my opinion, the "one Senator, one Vote" clause 
is the most problematic one remaining in the Constitution. 
The United States Senate flouts the constitutional principle 
of "one person, one vote," in large part because of the "one Sen-
ator, One Vote" clause. Chief Justice Warren said as much in 
Reynolds v. Sims,t where the Court held that state apportion-
ments following the example of the Senate violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Chief Justice 
wrote: 
* * * The right of a citizen to equal representation and to 
have [his or her] vote weighted equally with those of all other 
citizens in the election of members of one house of a bicam-
eral state legislature would amount to little if States could ef-
fectively submerge the equal-population principle in the 
apportionment of seats in the other house. * * * Deadlock 
between the two bodies might result in compromise and con-
cession on some issues. But in all too many cases the more 
probable result would be frustration of the majority will 
through minority veto in the house not apportioned on a pop-
ulation basis[.] 
The one Senator, one Vote clause is problematic, both because it 
is inconsistent with a bedrock constitutional value (majority rule) 
and because its derogation from that value threatens energetic 
government. The clause is more worrisome than other problem-
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atic clauses, because there is little room for "interpretation" to 
ameliorate its ill effects. 
The one Senator, one Vote clause systematically skews na-
tional policy towards sagebrush values. The fourteen sagebrush 
states2 have almost one-third of the votes in the U.S. Senate, but 
less than one-tenth of the people in the country. Although the 
sagebrush Senators are not completely homogeneous, they do 
exhibit block voting characteristics and predictably affect closely 
divided chamber votes. Three recent examples: if Senate votes 
were weighted according to the states' representation in the 
House (each Senator receiving half of the state's House allot-
ment), the Senate would have voted 295-140 to override Presi-
dent Bush's veto of the 1990 civil rights bill, would have rejected 
the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas for the Supreme 
Court in 1991 (albeit in a close vote, 224-211), and would have 
overwhelmingly (238-165) voted to remove the ban on entry into 
the United States of people who are infected with the HIV virus 
(a move that was defeated by 52-46 when proposed in 1993). 
Consider each example in more detail. 
The first example reveals the precise contours and some lim-
itations of my objection. Even if the Senate had overridden Pres-
ident Bush's veto in 1990, it is doubtful that the House would 
have done so. And, in any event, a civil rights bill was enacted in 
1991. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Warren's point can still be 
made: the one Senator, one Vote rule affects the point at which a 
compromise will be crafted; the 1991 civil rights statute was a 
diluted version of the 1990 bill.3 That the one Senator, one Vote 
rule is so strongly anti-democratic is cause for concern, but that 
concern might be ameliorated if it served a substantive value. 
For example, the Framers required bicameral approval and pre-
sentment to the President to assure that hasty majorities would 
not override individual liberties or unsettle the rule of law.4 
Sagebrush values are often billed as libertarian (less govern-
ment), but the sagebrush Senators' voting record is not distinc-
tively libertarian or sensitive to rule of law values. As a group, 
these Senators are libertarian when it comes to private rights to 
government land (in the West) but not libertarian when it comes 
2. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. 
3. For a key example, the 1990 bill explicitly overrode several Supreme Court deci-
sions retroactively. The 1991 statute was silent on the issue, and the Supreme Court pre-
dictably construed the statute not to have retroactive effect. See Landgraf v. US/ Film 
Products, 114 S. a. 1483 (1994). 
4. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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to farm subsidies, defense spending, and the Alaska Pipeline 
(where the sagebrush Senators were decisive in the Senate's in-
sistence that pipeline decisions affecting the environment be un-
reviewable). Moreover, these Senators seem relatively less 
sympathetic to the liberty of racial, ethnic, or sexual orientation 
minorities. For instance, they consistently vote for gratuitously 
anti-homosexual measures having no defensible policy rationale; 
their vote against HIV-positive immigrants was anti-libertarian 
and without any defensible medical justification. 
The Thomas confirmation vote reflects not just the fre-
quently decisive effect sagebrush overrepresentation has on is-
sues,s but also the far-reaching importance of that effect. Unlike 
the House, the Senate's consent is needed not only for the enact-
ment of legislation, but also for the confirmation of federal 
judges, agency heads, and department officials, as well as for rati-
fication of treaties (by a two-thirds supermajority). As a result, 
the sagebrush bloc not only has influence in Congress beyond 
any democratic or normative justification, but also has similarly 
indefensible influence on foreign policy, the composition of the 
judiciary, and public administration. 
The overrepresentation of small-population states ( espe-
cially the sagebrush states) in the Senate does not affect every 
issue that comes before Congress; it probably has no decisive ef-
fect on most issues. When it does have a decisive effect, the phe-
nomenon is anti-majoritarian but perhaps defensible according 
to some other normative criterion. I am open to such justifica-
tion, but the most obvious (libertarian) one is not supported by 
the actual behavior of sagebrush Senators, either recently or 
historically.6 
Based upon my review of our post-New Deal constitutional 
history, I am inclined to say that the one Senator, one Vote 
clause is the most problematic in the Constitution: it is anti-dem-
5. Nineteen sagebrush Senators (16 Republicans, three Democrats) voted for 
Judge Thomas, and only nine (all Democrats) voted against him. The overall Senate vote 
was 52-48 in favor of Judge Thomas. The only other region to support Judge Thomas was 
the South, including border states (19 Senators for, 15 Senators against). The Midwest, 
East, and Pacific Coast Senators opposed Judge Thomas' confirmation (14 Senators for, 
24 Senators against). 
6. The sagebrush Senators have been a distinctive bloc throughout the post-New 
Deal era. They have decisively influenced national policy through their alliance with 
Southern Senators to sink strong civil rights laws and their strong support of McCarthy-
ism in the 1950s, their Court-baiting and support for the nation's Indochina policy in the 
1960s and 1970s, and their opposition to environmental, health, and safety regulation in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
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ocratic, skews policy in hard-to-defend ways, and cannot be ame-
liorated by conventional interpretive or practical mechanisms. 
